Environmental regulations typically follow a command-and-control approach mandating the installation of state-of-the-art abatement technology and imposing hard emission thresholds. However, this type of regulations does not encourage process improvement and technological research to reduce emissions. In contrast, market-based environmental regulations stimulate continued improvement of cleaner manufacturing practices by creating economic incentives for sustained emission reduction. This paper aims at furnishing regulators and manufacturers with a tool to assess the impact of future regulatory scenarios using realistic chemical engineering models of pollution abatement operations.
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P R E V I E W 1 Introduction
Most existing environmental regulations follow a command-and-control approach. The regulators enforce stringent emission thresholds or specify which technology is necessary to control the emissions (e.g., maximum available control technology, MACT; state of the art treatments, SOTA; etc.). While manufacturers operating in a command-and-control environment ensure compliance, there are few incentives for further process improvement (Tietenberg, 1996) . This type of regulation does not encourage technological innovations beyond the regulatory limits. Therefore, the USEPA is moving away from traditional command-and-control towards market-based regulations in order to encourage sustained pollution prevention and emission reduction (USEPA, 2003a) . Market-based regulatory models establish competitive market forces to stimulate pollution prevention and accelerate technological research and development (e.g., Nichols, 1984; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Tietenberg, 1985 and 1996) . In a cap-and-trade model, a regulator sets a total cap of acceptable emission levels for a specific industry or set of polluters. This cap usually limits the total emissions in a region (e.g., the State of Illinois). The regulated industries receive titles known as emission permits or credits for the right to emit a certain amount of pollutant. The number of permits issued corresponds to the total volume of permissible emissions. Each polluter must render permits equal to the amount of pollution they cause at the end of each period, usually a year. A company can sell surplus permits on a secondary market for profit. If the polluter exceeds its allocated quota, it can purchase additional titles on the market. This type of system encourages pollution reduction measures by offering revenues for selling surplus pollution rights. Despite the free exchange of permits, the system guarantees that the total pollution does not exceed the specified cap. Hence, the emission permit system guarantees total emissions to remain below acceptable limits. Figure 1 illustrates the basic concept of cap-and-trade model considering only three polluters in a region (Companies A, B and C).
Example 1: Illustration of market-based emission regulations.
It is assumed that the initial emissions of the entire region amount to 60 Tons/y of a certain pollutant (e.g., SO 2 ; Plant A: 20 Tons/y, Plant B: 18 Tons/y, Plant C: 22 Tons/y). The regulatory agency determines an emission reduction of 27% for the region due to health concerns. The regulator allocates new emission credits in accordance with each plant's emission history in addition to factoring the desired 27% reduction (e.g., Plant A: 15 Tons/y, Plant B: 13 Tons/y, Plant C: 16 Tons/y). After installing new abatement technology, company B emits 12 Tons/y, thus leaving 1 Ton/y of unused permits, which it can sell for profit. Company C emits 17 Tons/y, 1 Ton more than the allocated amount. Therefore, company B sells its excess permits to Company C. Although Company C emits more than its original permit allocation, the total cap for the entire region is not surpassed (e.g., 15 + 12 + 17 = 44 Tons). This simplified example demonstrates the flexibility for industry to decide on timing and extent of necessary investments, while ensuring total emissions below the cap.
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Figure 1 Conceptual representation of cap and trade model
Economics research literature based on microeconomic theory demonstrated that emission trading achieves emission reductions at the minimum marginal abatement cost (e.g., Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Burtraw, 1996; Banzhaf et al., 2004 ). However, the high level of abstraction makes it difficult to relate this insight to the actual chemical operations on the plant floor. Recently, there is also interest in emission trading in the chemical engineering literature (e.g., Chakraborty et al., 2003; Maranas and Gupta, 2003; Linninger and Malcolm, 2005) . In order to study the efficacy of market-based regulations to induce clean manufacturing practices, it is proposed to study their impact of different types of regulatory policies on chemical plant operations of chemical industry.
If market-based approaches are actually superior to command-and-control, it should be possible to demonstrate the shift in recycle and waste management options adopted by manufacturers towards more resourceful environmentally benign plant operations. In order to relate environmental regulations to plant operations, we propose to use computational models capable of generating a comprehensive network of recycle and treatment options for all effluents in a chemical plant. The Combinatorial Process Synthesis (CPS) methodology proposed by Linninger and coworkers (Chakraborty and Linninger, 2002 , 2003a , 2003b Chakraborty et al., 2004 ) is expanded to assess the impact of different regulations on manufacturing. This paper aims at predicting the expected emissions and cost for a chemical industry operating in a geographic region in response to different regulatory policy options. The systematic method accounting for detailed technological models of chemical unit operations, their operating cost as well as investment cost for the installation of technology improvements will enable us to 'optimise' regulations for achieving desired emission reductions without excessive cost to manufacturers.
Outline
Section 2 presents the methodology for studying the interaction of different regulation types on the waste reduction efforts by polluters. Section 3 introduces a novel mathematical framework comparing the impact of command-and-control vs. market-based environmental control on the total emissions and economic performance of chemical manufacturing in a geographic region. The mathematical analysis will also P R E V I E W
